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Virtue epistemology argues that knowledge is more valuable than Gettierized belief because 
knowledge is an achievement, but Gettierized belief is not. The key premise in the achievement 
argument is that achievement is apt (successful because competent) and Gettierized belief is 
inapt (successful because lucky). I first argue that the intuition behind the achievement argument 
is based wrongly on the fact that ‘being successful because lucky’ implicates ‘being not 
competent enough’. I then offer an argument from moral luck to argue that virtue 
epistemologists should maintain that knowledge is no more valuable than Gettierized belief. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Virtue epistemologists, like John Greco (2010) and Ernest Sosa (2007, 2011), often advertise 
their account of knowledge for being able to solve the problems about the value of knowledge. 
More specifically, they argue that virtue epistemology can explain why knowledge is more 
valuable than justified true belief that falls short of knowledge (henceforth, Gettierized belief for 
short) (Jones, 1997; Kvanvig, 2003; Pritchard, 2010). Very roughly, their reasons are that 
knowledge is an achievement (apt) whereas Gettierized belief is not (inapt) and that achievement 
is constitutive of our flourishing. Hence, knowledge is more valuable than Gettierized belief. 
Virtue epistemology has a unique feature that distinguishes it from other theories of 
knowledge: that is, it considers knowledge as a kind of cognitive performance and thus epistemic 
evaluation as a species of performance evaluation. In Sosa’s terms, there are three aspects of 
performance evaluation: success, competence, and aptness (success because of competence). Accordingly, a 
cognitive performance is successful when the belief that the performance produces is true, 
competent when the performance is done through exercising one’s cognitive abilities or virtues, 
and apt when the performance is successful because competent. Knowledge is thus apt belief, 
whereas Gettierized belief is inapt. And apt performance is a better kind of performance than 
inapt performance. 
This account of the value of knowledge has been criticized on several grounds. Jonathan 
Kvanvig (2003) and Duncan Pritchard (2010) argue that it fails because its account of knowledge 
is also Gettierized, that is, some Gettierized beliefs are apt.1 Daniel Whiting (2012) argues that 
some achievements are not constitutive of our flourishing because they are easy. I will offer a 
novel argument to show that, even granted that virtue epistemology can meet the above 
objections, what virtue epistemologists should maintain is that Gettierized belief (inapt 
performance) can also be as valuable as knowledge (apt performance). I first argue that virtue 
epistemologists base their value intuition wrongly on the equation between being inapt and being 
successful because lucky. Since ‘being successful because lucky’ often implicates ‘being not competent 
enough’, it is not surprising that virtue epistemologists draw the wrong conclusion that inapt 
performances are inferior to apt ones (sec 3). To see why the equation should be avoided, I 
examine the concept of aptness in section 2. Finally, in section 4, I show that the achievement 
argument is also undermined by this equation and offer an argument from moral luck to show 
that virtue epistemologists should maintain that inapt performances can be as valuable as apt 
ones.   
 
2. WHAT IS APTNESS? 
In this section, I examine the concept of aptness. Aptness is defined as ‘success because of 
competence’. The phrase ‘success because of competence’ indicates that the point of aptness 
evaluation is to offer a causal explanation of the success. More specifically, aptness evaluation is 
not just seeking any cause of the success. It is to assess whether the performance’s competence 
can explain why it is successful. When that is the case, the success is attributable to the 
performance, as Greco explains: 
In cases of knowledge, S believes the truth because S’s belief is produced by ability. In Ernest 
Sosa’s terminology, S’s belief is ‘true because competent’. But what are phrases of the form ‘X 
because Y’ getting at in this context? The answer is attribution: In cases of knowledge, S’s 
success is attributable to S’s ability, which is to say that it is attributable to S. (Greco, 2012, p.1) 
                                                 
1 However, Carter (2016), Greco (2010, 2011), and Sosa (2007, 2011) offer plausible counter-arguments. 
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But how should ‘attributability’ be understood? In Greco (2010) and Sosa (2007), attributability 
is explained in terms of explanatory salience: X is attributable to Y (or Y explains why X) if and only 
if Y is the most salient cause of X. Why the most salient cause, not the cause or a cause? The reason 
is that for every event, there are usually multiple causes contributing to it, and not all of them 
contribute equally. If lightning causes a forest fire, lightning is not the only possible cause. Other 
causes include the dry and hot weather, oxygen, combustible materials such as woods and 
grasses. Without any one of these factors, the forest fire might not occur. But usually we think 
that lightning is the most salient cause, so we attribute the cause of the forest fire to lightning. 
More accurately, the fact that the forest fire occurs is primarily attributable to lightning, since there 
are other less salient causes. Thus, when virtue epistemologists say that a performance is apt 
because its success is attributable to competence, they do not mean that competence is the only 
cause. Rather, they mean that competence is the most salient cause, among others, of why the 
performance is successful. 
There are, certainly, many factors contributing to the success of a performance. To the present 
purpose, however, we only need to focus on two factors: competence and luck. For they are what 
virtue epistemologists mostly focus on. Very often, virtue epistemologists describe inapt 
performances as ones that are ‘successful because lucky’ (which I will discuss in the next section). 
When virtue epistemologists decide whether a performance is apt, they decide whether 
competence or luck is the most salient cause of its success. 
Though the idea of being the most salient cause looks intuitive, things are more complicated 
than it looks. Greco (2012) distinguishes two versions of this idea: the quantitative account and the 
qualitative account. The quantitative account maintains that a success is attributable to its 
competence just in case it depends on its competence more (to a certain degree) than luck. The 
qualitative account holds that a success is attributable to its competence just in case its 
competence ‘contributes to that success in the right way, where “in the right way” means “in a way 
that would regularly serve relevant purposes”’ (Greco, 2012, p.14). Greco adopts the qualitative 
account, but J. Adam Carter (2016) argues, correctly in my opinion, that the quantitative account 
is preferable to the qualitative account. Furthermore, the qualitative account is not really helpful. 
Take the following case from Sosa for example: 
Apt Shot. Archie took aim and shot skillfully. His shot hit the bull’s-eye.  
Inapt Shot. Archie took aim and shot skillfully. However, his arrow was blown away by a gust 
of wind. Fortunately, another gust of wind blew his arrow back to its original trajectory and hit 
the bull’s-eye. 
The qualitative account would have to say that Archie’s competence contributes to the success—
for the purpose of archery—in the right way in Apt Shot but in the wrong way in Inapt Shot. 
But this is puzzling, since nothing changes on Archie’s side. Certainly, in Inapt Shot, Archie’s 
ability—aiming at the target, steadying his body, observing the environmental factors (such as 
wind)—does contribute in the way that that would regularly serve the purpose of archery. So, the 
qualitative account has difficulty in offering a clean-cut explanation for Inapt Shot.2 On the 
contrary, the quantitative account offers an intuitive explanation: the success depends more on 
luck than on competence in Inapt Shot. Henceforth, I will assume the quantitative account, 
though my arguments should not be affected if one prefers the qualitative account. 
In light of the quantitative account, I suspect that one may argue that, in Inapt Shot, the 
success depends on competence no less than luck so Archie’s shot is apt in both scenarios. After 
                                                 
2 Greco may argue that Inapt-Shot is actually apt. However, it contradicts with most people’s view. How 
to decide whether a performance is apt is a tricky task, which I will discuss. 
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all, Archie’s shot might miss the target were he less competent. This does not affect the 
quantitative account, however. For the quantitative account implies that borderline cases can 
easily happen. This is an important feature of virtue epistemology that receives scant attention, 
and we will see how it affects the account of virtue epistemology about the value of knowledge. 
 
3. INAPT = SUCCESSFUL BECAUSE LUCKY? 
In this section, I argue that we should resist a simple argument by virtue epistemologists: namely, 
knowledge (apt performance) is better than Gettierized belief (inapt performance) because a 
performance that is successful because competent is a better performance than one that is successful 
because lucky. Understanding why this simple argument should be resisted helps us uncover a 
fundamental mistake shared by virtue epistemologists. 
We can find this simple argument in the following passages from Sosa and Greco: 
Suppose that belief to be competently acquired but Gettiered, so that it is true only by epistemic 
luck [my italics]. … Inapt performances fall short not only in that they might have been better 
on relevant dimensions. They fall short in the fuller sense that they fail to meet minimum 
standards for performances. Because they are inapt, they are therefore flawed: not just 
improvable but defective. (Sosa, 2011, p.46) 
The proposed solution answers even [the value problem of knowledge], respecting the 
supposition that knowledge is more valuable than all of its parts taken together. This is 
because success from ability is more valuable than an act that is both successful and from 
ability, but not successful because from ability. Suppose, for example, that an athlete runs a race 
in a way that is clearly an exercise of her athletic excellence. Suppose also that she wins, but 
only because the other runners, some of whom are equally excellent, get sick before the race. 
Or suppose that she wins, but only because the other runners were bribed. Clearly, neither 
sort of win is as valuable as it could be. What one really values as an athlete is to win as the 
result of ability. (Greco, 2010, p.99) 
Greco and Sosa both hold that a successful-because-competent performance is better than a 
successful-because-lucky performance. Why? The passage from Sosa is not helpful since he 
merely asserts that inapt performances are flawed. So, let me focus on Greco’s athlete example. 
Intuitively, the win because of the athlete’s own ability is a better performance than the win 
because of others’ physical difficulties (luck) or even cheating. Since performance evaluation 
applies to belief and knowledge, virtue epistemology seems to offer a neat solution. 
The simple argument, however, is wrong-headed. True, when we say that a performance is 
successful because lucky, we tend to think that it is inferior to a performance that is successful 
because competent. But that is because the sentence ‘He wins because of luck’ often implicates 
‘he would not win without the luck’. And from ‘he would not win without the luck’, people tend to 
infer that he is not competent enough. It is not surprising, therefore, that the simple argument appears 
to work, since we tend to think that a successful-because-lucky performance is less or not competent 
and, as a result, inapt performances are worse performances than apt ones. 
This tendency is actually manifest in the above quotations from Greco and Sosa. Greco first 
correctly stipulates ‘in-apt’ as ‘not “successful because adroit”’, from which he then wrongly claim 
that the athlete’s inapt performance is ‘successful only because lucky’. Similarly, in Sosa’s 
quotation, a Gettierized belief is ‘true only by epistemic luck’. Obviously, this is invalid. ‘A 
performance is successful only because lucky’ would even more strongly implicate that the 
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performance is not competent enough.3 But inapt performances could be as successful and competent 
as apt ones. Clearly, the simple argument is fallacious because the issue is whether apt 
performances are more valuable than inapt performances that are equally successful and competent. To 
avoid unnecessary confusion, we need to cancel the implicature by explicitly stipulating the 
examples of Gettierized performance as being inapt but as successful and competent as their apt 
counterparts. Let us redescribe Greco’s example and test our intuition again:  
Suppose, for example, that an athlete runs a race in a way that is clearly an exercise of her 
athletic excellence. Suppose also that she wins, because the other runners, some of whom are 
equally excellent, get sick before the race. Or suppose that she wins, because the other runners 
were bribed. But remember: she, in fact, is truly competent. That is, even if other athletes were in good 
conditions and competed in the race competently, she might still win the game.  
Once the case is redescribed as such, I doubt that we would still have the intuition that this 
athlete’s performance is less good simply because of being inapt in such a way. In both cases, her 
performances are equally successful and competent. The only difference is that in the inapt case, 
it is just that other athletes happen to be ill or bribed (not even by her), which has nothing to do 
with her performance. 
Admittedly, people’s intuitions differ. Virtue epistemologists may insist that the athlete’s 
performance becomes a worse performance simply because of being inapt, even when it is 
equally successful and competent. The point of this section is modest: it is to clear up a potential 
confusion when testing our intuition. We need to bear in mind that inapt performances can be as 
successful and competent as their apt counterparts. It is true that inapt performances are 
successful because lucky, but it must be understood in the technical sense explained in section 2. 
To say the least, the athlete example is unable to elicit a strong intuition that apt performances 
are better than inapt ones. And we will see that this confusion affects the achievement 
argument—probably the most substantial argument virtue epistemologists have for the superior 
value of knowledge to Gettierized belief. 
 
4. ACHIEVEMENT AND LUCK 
Greco (2010, ch.6) has a more substantial argument for the superior value of knowledge to 
Gettierized belief: the achievement argument. The achievement argument can be formulated as 
follows: 
(P1) A performance is an achievement if and only if it is apt; 
(P2) Knowledge is apt, and Gettierized belief is inapt; 
(C1) So, knowledge is an achievement, and Gettierized belief is not; 
(P3) Achievements have a sort of final value, which non-achievements lack; 
                                                 
3 In light of this, it is difficult to see how Greco can describe the athlete’s performance as successful only 
because lucky, but meanwhile maintains that her performance is competent (‘an exercise of her athletic 
excellence’). For if she does run competently, it is wrong to say that she wins only because other runners 
are sick or bribed. Saying that suggests that she would simply not be competent enough to win the race, if 
other runners were really competing. Hence, it would be wrong to describe it as a case in which the 
performance is competent. Competence does not just require the performer to do the best she can. 
Rather, it requires that the performer can reliably bring success (Greco, 2010, p.77;  see also Sosa, 2015, 
ch.4). If the athlete can win the race only because other runners do not run competently, it is difficult to 
say that her running is competent. Therefore, Greco’s athlete example is inadequate. 
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(C2) So, knowledge is more valuable than Gettierized belief.4 
For the sake of argument, I assume that P2 is correct. I argue that either P1 or P3 (or both) is 
false. For either inapt performances can also be achievements, or they, if construed as non-
achievements, are as valuable as apt performances. To begin with, let us look closer to Greco’s 
reason why an apt performance (achievement) is finally valuable: 
In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle makes a distinction between (a) achieving some end by luck 
or accident, and (b) achieving the end through the exercise of one’s abilities (or virtues). It is 
only the latter kind of action, Aristotle argues, that is both intrinsically valuable and 
constitutive of human flourishing. ‘Human good,’ he writes, ‘turns out to be activity of soul 
exhibiting excellence.’ (Greco, 2010, pp.97-98) 
We can accept Greco’s claim that success through ability is constitutive of human flourishing. The 
readers should now see where the problem lies in: it seems wrong to say that inapt 
performances—when being equally successful and competent—are successful by luck rather 
than successful through ability. Certainly, in Greco’s athlete example and Sosa’s archery example, 
both protagonists exercise their abilities competently. While it is true that luck is prominent in 
the inapt version of both examples, their abilities are still salient causes of their successes. So, it 
seems correct to describe their performances as successes through abilities. Imagine a 
commentator who watch both games comments: ‘Their successes are well deserved. Their 
performances are really competent!’ The comment seems fair. Therefore, inapt performances can 
be achievements and finally valuable. 
To make my point more concrete, let us look at another example. To make a befitting 
example of inapt performance, it is crucial to construe it as being inapt just because luck is more 
prominent in itself than in the apt case (hence success and competence remain unchanged). This 
actually follows Linda Zagzebski’s famous recipe for Gettierized case (Zagzebski, 1994): a 
performance, which might be otherwise apt, could become inapt just because of the intervention 
or presence of luck. Consider the following example of journal publication: 
Apt Publication. David submits his paper to Journal of Great Philosophy. The journal policy is to 
reject any paper that does not receive two unanimously positive reports from the reviewers. 
Both reviewers judge—correctly, let us assume—that David’s paper is excellent. So David’s 
paper gets accepted. 
Inapt Publication. In this scenario, one of the original reviewers is too ill to referee David’s 
paper. The editors replace her with another one. Unfortunately for David, the new reviewer 
dislikes David’s paper just because it argues against his own position regardless of the virtues 
of David’s paper. Lucky for David, the new reviewer becomes seriously injured and unable to 
referee. The editors know that the original reviewer becomes well and ask her for help. She 
gives the same positive report. So, David paper gets accepted.  
To avoid confusion, let me stipulate that the success condition of David’s performance—
submitting a paper to Journal of Great Philosophy for review—is the acceptance of his paper and it 
is competent in the sense that the paper is truly excellent. In Apt Publication, David’s 
performance is apt because his competence is the most salient cause of the acceptance of his 
paper. In Inapt Publication, however, David’s performance is inapt because it is likely that 
David’s paper would not be accepted—namely, his success is not safe—because of the 
intervention of luck.  
                                                 
4 This argument is modified from Pritchard’s formulation (2010, p.67), which is only about whether 
knowledge is finally valuable. 
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It seems wrong to say that David’s performance in Inapt Publication is not an achievement of 
David and not constitutive of his flourishing. Clearly, David exercises his philosophical abilities 
well and writes an excellent paper. True, there is some significant luck in explaining why David’s 
paper gets accepted. But it remains true that David achieves his end through his abilities. To put it 
another way, it is hard to deny David is equally good as a philosopher in both scenarios, since 
nothing changes on his side of performance. This means that the publication of his paper in 
both scenarios contributes equally to his flourishing as a philosopher (which, let us assume, 
contributes to his flourishing as a human). It would be wrong to say that David’s publication in 
Inapt Publication is less valuable because it means that David in Inapt Publication is not as good 
a philosopher as he in Apt Publication. So, both performances contribute equally to David’s 
flourishing and are thus equally valuable.  
I suspect that some may still beg to differ. If so, I urge them to consider the possibility that 
luck is significant even in apt cases, to the extent that it is reasonable to conclude that all 
performances are inapt. Consider the following argument: 
(P4) A successful performance is apt if and only if its success depends more on competence 
than luck; 
(P5) For all performances, if they are successful, their success depends more on luck than 
competence; 
(C3) So, all successful performances are inapt. 
The crucial premise, of course, is P5. P5 looks ludicrous, but it may not be. For proponents of 
moral luck, it is well-known that luck significantly affects many dimensions of moral assessment. 
As proponents of moral luck (Nagel, 1979; Nelkin, 2013) often distinguishes, there are four types 
of moral luck: resultant, constitutive, circumstantial, and causal. Resultant luck affects whether a 
performance turns out to be successful. Constitutive luck usually affects competence when there 
is luck in who we are and what we can. Circumstantial luck can affect all three aspects of 
performance evaluation: what performances we may have and whether they are successful, 
competent, and apt depend greatly on what circumstances we happen to be in (I leave causal luck 
out because it is less relevant to the present purpose). Since luck significantly affects all 
dimensions of performance evaluation, it seems more ludicrous to say that our successes depend 
more on us than luck. Hence, all successes are inapt. 
Take the athlete for example. Even when it is ‘apt’, luck still plays a significant role in 
explaining why she is competent because she may be gifted in running, live in a society where she 
can receive the best training, and not be ill on the day of race. Luck is also significant in 
explaining why her performance is ‘apt’. Let me slightly modify the example. Suppose there is 
one athlete who is her only contender (so we can ignore the performances of other competitors), 
who happened to be injured several weeks before the race. Now consider two possibilities: 
Apt Athlete. The contender is fully recovered and run competently (let us assume she breaks 
the record). Nevertheless, the athlete runs faster and wins the race; 
Inapt Athlete. The contender has not recovered yet so she quits. The athlete thus wins the race 
without strong contenders (though she runs equally fast).  
In both scenarios, the only changing factor is luck about whether the contender competes.  Since 
it is just a matter of luck whether the athlete’s competence is more salient than luck, we can say 
that her performance is ‘apt’ or ‘inapt’ by luck. In other words, if it is reasonable for virtue 
epistemologists to say that inapt performances are successful by luck, it is also reasonable, in light 
of the possibility of moral luck, to say that all performances are successful or unsuccessful by 
luck, competent or incompetent by luck, and apt or inapt by luck. Hence, we can conclude that all 
performances are inapt because their successes depend more on luck than competence. 
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When I say that a performance is ‘apt by luck’, it may sound an oxymoron because aptness 
means that a performance’s success is not lucky. We see above that aptness is a matter of causal 
explanation of a performance’s success, which can be context-sensitive. In light of the context 
sensitivity of aptness, we may distinguish between two levels or contexts of causal explanation of 
a performance’s success and aptness. On the first or ordinary level, we often exclude moral luck 
as a cause of success. The reason may be that moral luck is omnipresent so that we tend to 
ignore, just like oxygen is usually not featured in an explanation of a fire accident. Or maybe it is 
offensive in ordinary life to include moral luck as part of the explanation, like saying that David’s 
success and competence as a philosopher are partly due to his ethnicity, gender, or family 
background. Nevertheless, on the second or reflective level, we may include moral luck to 
examine the value of one’s achievement. So, a performance is first-level apt when its success 
depends more on competence than first-level luck that excludes moral luck. But it is second-level 
inapt because moral luck is the most salient cause of its success, competence, and aptness. 
Accordingly, C3 should be modified as ‘all successful performances are second-level inapt’.5 
Virtue epistemologists cannot save the achievement argument by arguing that an achievement 
only needs to be first-level apt. For the idea behind the final value of achievement is that it is not 
something we earn by luck, which does not distinguish between different sorts of luck. 
Distinguishing two levels of aptness does not mean that factors on the second level are less real 
than those on the first level. So it would be wrong to exclude moral luck when reflecting upon 
whether we earn our success by luck. Since all of the above examples shows that we can achieve 
the same success by exercising the same competence and it is a matter of luck whether it is apt or 
inapt, it would be wrong to conclude that only first-level apt performances are achievements 
because only they are not successful by luck. 
Granted that my argument is correct, virtue epistemologists may, instead, maintain that all 
performances are not achievements and not constitutive of our flourishing, or that successful 
and competent performances—no matter whether it is apt or inapt—are achievements and 
constitutive of our flourishing. I prefer the second position, though I will not argue for it here.6 
My aim of this paper is to show that virtue epistemologists are wrong to claim that knowledge is 
more valuable than Gettierized belief. Instead, what their account shows is that they are equally 
valuable. 
There might be some concerns. First, one may argue that moral assessment is different from 
performance evaluation, so moral luck is inapplicable to performance. I disagree. It is clear that 
                                                 
5 Sosa (2011, 2015) also famously claims that there can be higher levels of aptness; for instance, knowing 
full well is apt belief aptly guided by meta-competence (the agent’s assessment of their chance of success). 
However, Sosa’s higher levels of aptness remain on the first level of aptness according to my distinction 
since our concerns are different. Nevertheless, one may think that Sosa’s account of knowing full well can 
explain how certain knowledge is more valuable than Gettierized belief. I have two points in response. 
First, even if that is true, it still does not show that mere knowledge (apt belief) is more valuable than 
Gettierized belief. Second, my argument here can apply to full aptness: similarly, whether a belief is fully 
apt (apt because of meta-competence) is a matter of luck (e.g. see Sosa’s description of Diana’s shot (2011, 
p.12)). What explains the extra value of knowing full well is simply the additional level of competence, i.e. 
meta-competence. 
6 Several empirical studies (Colaço, Buckwalter, Stich, & Machery, 2014; Turri, 2016, 2017; Turri, 
Buckwalter, & Blouw, 2014) show that achievement and knowledge tolerate luck and unreliability, as 
Turri concludes: ‘when the agent repeatedly misidentifies structures as barns, the presence of fakes is an 
obvious external explanation for her errors, so people do not conclude that she is unable to identify 
barns. This coheres with recent findings showing that when someone forms a true belief, people’s default 
assumption is that she formed the true belief through a relevant cognitive ability and thus knows’ (2017, 
p.112). 
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virtue epistemologists intend that their account of performance evaluation applies to all sorts of 
performances and moral action is certainly a kind of performance.7 So, a moral action may be 
assessed whether it achieves its end (successful), whether it is done reliably and out of the right 
kind of moral motivations or principles (competent), and whether it achieves its end through 
moral competence (apt). This also explains why Aristotle’s account of final value about 
achievement is regarded as befitting to virtue epistemologists. 
Second, one may think that I confuse moral luck with epistemic luck. While it is widely held that 
knowledge cannot tolerate epistemic luck, knowledge is compatible with certain types of luck, 
such as circumstantial luck (Pritchard, 2005, Ch.5.2). For example, Darwin might not discover 
evolution if he was not born in a rich family or he did not get on board of the Beagle. So, virtue 
epistemologists may argue that moral luck ought to be excluded from performance evaluation. 
However, this actually reveals another problem for virtue epistemology. When it regards 
epistemic evaluation as a kind of performance evaluation, it is hard to see why moral luck should 
be excluded since, as we have seen, moral luck affects all aspects of performance evaluation. 
Furthermore, our concern here is about the value of knowledge rather than the nature of 
knowledge. The achievement argument trades on the intuition that an achievement should not 
be successful by luck, which does not distinguish between epistemic and moral luck. So, virtue 
epistemologists owe us an argument why a successful performance by moral luck can be an 
achievement whereas one by epistemic luck cannot. 
Third, one may respond that the existence of moral luck is controversial. I acknowledge that. 
For the present dialectical context, however, it is safe to assume the existence of moral luck 
because virtue epistemologists accept it. Sosa’s archery example and Greco’s athlete example are 
both affected by circumstantial luck. Furthermore, proponents of moral luck (Nussbaum, 1986; 
Williams, 1981) often argue that moral luck is an important element in Aristotle’s moral thinking. 
For example, Aristotle says: ‘some think that we are made good by nature, others by habituation, 
others by teaching. Nature's part evidently does not depend on us, but as a result of some divine 
causes is present in those who are truly fortunate’ (1179b20-3). To be sure, I do not need to 
prove the truth of P5, but rather to show that virtue epistemologists would have to accept P5. 
Finally, one may think that Inapt Performance and Inapt Athlete (perhaps all the inapt cases 
under discussion) are not really inapt; after all, competence is still a significant cause of their 
success. However, this should not be regarded as a problem of mine. Since aptness is a matter of 
whether competence is more salient than luck, borderline cases can occur easily. What 
Zagzebski’s recipe actually teaches us, in the terms of virtue epistemology, is how to produce 
borderline cases like the ones under discussion. All it needs is to make luck more salient without 
affecting success and competence. Since my cases, as well as the ones given by Greco and Sosa, 
are produced in accordance with this recipe, they should be regarded as Gettierized (inapt). 
Nevertheless, it may enlighten us about the true significance of the Gettier problem, for we may 
similarly consider some Gettier-style cases not as genuine counter-examples but as borderline 
cases. 
 
                                                 
7 For example, Greco says: ‘knowledge is a kind of achievement, or a kind of success for which the 
knower deserves credit. ... This is a ubiquitous and perfectly familiar sort of normativity. Thus we credit 
people for their athletic achievements, for their artistic achievements, and for their moral achievements’ 




Virtue epistemologists argue that knowledge is more valuable than Gettierized belief because apt 
performance is constitutive of flourishing but inapt performance is not. They usually support 
their arguments with examples of performance. However, intuitions about those examples often 
trade wrongly on the implicature that a luckily successful performance is not competent enough 
and is not one’s achievement, which ignores the fact that it can be equally competent. 
Furthermore, the account of epistemic evaluation as performance evaluation invites us to reflect 
on the effect of moral luck. Since moral luck affects all aspects of performance evaluation, virtue 
epistemologists are wrong to describe apt performances as ‘success through ability’ and inapt 
performances as ‘success by luck’, which undermines their achievement argument. Given that a 
performance can be apt or inapt by luck, virtue epistemologists should maintain that knowledge 
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